The Legacy of Ball's Bluff
By Patricia Caldwell

Ball's Bluff. It doesn't evoke the passions of mighty Gettysburg, or approach the ferocity of Cold Harbor. The action at Ball's Bluff never engendered the feelings of a people as did the siege of Vicksburg. It doesn't even earn a footnote in the majority of American History books. So what is it about the battle of Ball's Bluff that has led to its being called " a small battle and its long shadow"?*

In terms of the number of troops who participated in the action and of total casualties, Ball's Bluff would seem to have had little impact, and as far as military significance, it pales in comparison with other actions of the various campaigns. But the political consequence of the battle at Ball's Bluff ,the establishment of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, would pervade the military atmosphere and affect the actions of military commanders for the next five years.

Ball's Bluff and its aftermath was a Civil War battle in miniature, with all the elements inherent in this brothers' war -- intrigue, incompetence, heroism, ignorance, death and horror, coincidence and irony.

To understand the importance of Ball's Bluff it is necessary to understand the environment in which it occurred. In October of 1861 the war is six months old. The people of the Northern states had been embarrassed by their much touted defeats in the first two collisions of the war, at Big Bethel in June and at Bull Run in July of the year. The Southern populace, on the other hand, was imbued with confidence. Didn't they whip the Yankees? Weren't they that much closer to winning their independence?

Once again, as it had in the summer, the sound of "Onward to Richmond" was ringing out across the North. And once again, General George B. McClellan was feeling the pressure to do something, anything, to give the Union forces a much needed victory and to avenge the earlier defeats.

Both armies were still virtually untried. Many of the volunteers who had participated in the fighting at Big Bethel and Bull Run had seen their period of enlistment come to an end, to be replaced by new inexperienced recruits. These recruits still needed to learn to be soldiers, to obey orders, and to master even the most rudimentary of military maneuvers. Their line officers, very many of whom had been newly elected or appointed to their posts, needed to learn how to command men in combat. This inexperience in field command didn't end there, but was also evident in the general officers, many of whom had never commanded troops in hostile action, or at the very least, had never before been called upon to coordinate the movements of so many men.

As the autumn of 1861 approached, both armies expected little action in the way of hostilities and were content to settle down on their established lines and wait for spring. The common soldier on both sides continued to picket the Potomac River, calling across to one another for news and to exchange such valuable commodities as coffee and tobacco.

General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confederate forces, was cognizant of the fact that, while his forces were limited, his counterpart, General McClellan was receiving thousands of recruits for defense of the Union capital. Consequently, with the Potomac River as the dividing line between the two opposing forces, Johnston began consolidating his 41,000 troops into what he believed would be a stronger position. He wasn't planning an offensive at this time of the year.

On the Northern front there was much consternation about the status of the Union military situation. Washington D.C., while the Federal capital, was also a hotbed of Confederate sympathy and inside the Southern sphere of influence. Since the outbreak of hostilities many political expediencies had been tried, such as President Abraham Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the imprisonment without trial of many Marylanders and Washingtonians under the suspicion of having Southern loyalties. From the very beginning of the secession crisis the authorities in Washington had been wary of disloyalty among the civilian population of the capital. Didn't President-Elect Lincoln have to arrive in the city under cover of disguise to avoid assassination? Didn't the Federal authorities have to take extraordinary measures to ensure the uneventful inauguration of this sectional President?

Ironically, the man chosen to guarantee Lincoln's safety and to defend the Federal Capital was one Colonel Charles Pomeroy Stone. Colonel Stone was a veteran of the Mexican War, who after leaving the army for a career in the private sector, offered his services to the Army at the beginning of the civil crisis. So from December of 1860 until May of 1861 Colonel Stone virtually single-handedly worked to ensure that Washington D.C. remained the Federal Capital instead of becoming a Southern city. While President Lincoln obviously knew the efforts put forth by Colonel Stone to protect the city, he may have been unaware of the fact that Stone had uncovered a plot to blow up the inauguration platform and so assassinate the incoming President. During the inaugural procession by his ploy of clumsily spurring their horses the cavalry escort for the presidential carriage kept up a moving target to prevent any potential marksmen from getting a good bead on the occupants of the carriage.

Among Colonel Stone's other activities for protecting Washington were seizing control of the telegraph office and the Baltimore Railroad, placing guards on all the bridges over the Potomac and on all the roads leading into the city, and closing the Potomac to small shipping traffic in order to prevent information being carried to secessionists in Virginia. On his instructions the White House itself had guards posted for the first time. As reward the Lincoln administration promoted Colonel Stone to Brigadier General and placed him in charge of the Federal advance into Virginia and the subsequent capture of Alexandria in May of 1861. At this point General Stone's career seemed to be on the fast track. Ironically not only would this hero's military career be virtually ruined by the events at Ball's Bluff, but his personal reputation, so far unassailable, would be all but destroyed by the disaster.

What was it about this battle that could so harm such a highly respected soldier? What series of events could precipitate such a disaster? What happened?

As the seasons changed both armies, each on its own side of the Potomac, wanted nothing more than to settle in for the winter. Neither commander wanted a pitched battle but they kept up appearances by occasionally probing the picket lines of the enemy. Certainly McClellan could not afford to fight a battle and lose. Another defeat for Northern forces would lead to more finger-pointing, suspicion at the administrative level, anger and frustration among the civilian populace at home. But the best laid plans of these two commanders would come to naught.

After the Federal losses at Big Bethel and Bull Run the authorities in Washington began to question why they had happened. The fact that the capital was still home to southern sympathizers made the administration wonder if perhaps the army, too, could have officers with southern leaning. How else could the Northern army have suffered defeat at the hands of the Confederates? The North needed a victory. Could the people wait until spring? Pressure started to mount on General McClellan to produce that much-needed victory and to do it soon. It was under these circumstances that the debacle at Ball's Bluff came to pass. And the officials at Washington, in particular the powerful Radical Republicans in Congress, in an atmosphere of anger, recrimination and impatience, would look for a traitor on whom to place the blame for military failure.

On the Confederate side the atmosphere was entirely different. With the aforementioned victories over the Federals the Southern leaders were content to build up their strength and wait for warmer weather. But with the number of sympathizers taking the pulse of Washington General Johnston knew that McClellan was being pressured to move, so he needed to fortify his lines and keep his pickets alert.

Consequently on October 17, 1861 Confederate troops were withdrawn from Fairfax Court House and on October 18 Johnston recalled his advanced outposts in northern Virginia. With these troops he would establish a new and more defensible line in a triangular area with Centreville at the apex and the base running between the original Bull Run battlefield and Manassas Junction.

As McClellan became aware of these movements he sent some troops into Virginia to occupy the abandoned positions, thereby increasing his foothold on the Confederate side of the Potomac. Despite what seemed like a Confederate withdrawal McClellan believed that this rebel force was gearing up for an offensive puss across the Potomac with possibly Washington D.C. as the target.

One position not yet evacuated by the Confederates was Leesburg, Virginia, about 35 miles up the Potomac from the Union capital. Leesburg was the terminus of the Loudoun & Hampshire Railroad, and up to now the left flank of the Confederate army. Whoever controlled this town had control of the valuable river crossings at Conrad's Ferry and Edwards' Ferry. They would also have access to the rail and communications link to the strategically significant Shenandoah Valley and to the rich agricultural areas of Loudoun County.

McClellan decided that a demonstration on Leesburg could have a manifold effect: first, to drive the enemy out of the area of northern Virginia with little or no fighting; second , to boost morale among the troops and the Northern populace in general; and third, to ease the political pressure being put on him by the administration in Washington.

Leesburg at this time was garrisoned by a brigade of Confederate troops under the command of Colonel Nathan "Shanks" Evans, one of the heroes of First Manassas as the South preferred to call the first battle at Bull Run. He was nicknamed "Shanks" supposedly for his long skinny legs. Under Evans' command was the Seventh Brigade of General P. G. T. Beauregard's First Corps of the Confederate Army which included the 13th, 17th and 18th regiments of Mississippi troops and the 8th Virginia Infantry, along with three companies of Virginia cavalry and the 1st company of the Richmond Howitzers.

Across the Potomac in Maryland the Union line was commanded by Brigadier General Charles Stone, headquartered at Poolesville. The Federal troops were aptly named the Corps of Observation as their chief responsibility to this point had been to guard the approaches to the Potomac in the area between Point of Rocks, 10 miles north of Leesburg, to Edwards' Ferry, where the Potomac could be crossed at a direct road to Leesburg. These troops consisted of three brigades of infantry -- Brigadier General William Gorman's brigade of the 34th New York, the 42nd New York (also called the Tammany Regiment), the 2nd New York State Militia, the 1st Minnesota and the 15th Massachusetts; Colonel Edward D. Baker's California Brigade (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th California), which would later be called the Philadelphia Brigade (71st, 69th, 72nd and 106th Pennsylvania) as they all hailed from the City of Brotherly Love; and Colonel Frederick Lander's 7th Michigan, 19th and 20th Massachusetts, and Andrew's company of Massachusetts sharpshooters. General Stone also had under his command several artillery units and a company of cavalry.

Additional Federal troops were already across the Potomac in Virginia directly across the river from Washington D.C., the 13,000 Pennsylvania Reserve Division under the command of General George A. McCall. The disaster known as the battle of Ball's Bluff would begin on October 19 when General McClellan sent a message to General McCall to take his Reserves inland on the Georgetown Turnpike to Dranesville, about 15 miles southeast of Leesburg. This movement was accomplished with little difficulty and led to Confederate General Evans apparently abandoning Leesburg, and sending his supply trains south, or so the Union high command thought. This movement was observed by the Federal signal station on Sugarloaf Mountain and they immediately notified General McClellan of what they had seen. Apparently the advance of General McCall was having the desired effect of clearing out Leesburg without a fight! McClellan saw his chance! Early on the morning of October 20 he sent word to General Stone at Poolesville that McCall was moving on Dranesville and sending out recon patrols looking for the enemy. He then ordered Stone to "keep a good look out upon Leesburg" to see if this movement had the desired effect of driving Evans out of the town, and to make a "slight demonstration" across the Potomac to help move them along. Hopefully the Union forces could score a victory with little or no fighting!

Colonel Evans, however, was already aware of the Federal intentions even before General Stone had received McClellan's orders. One of General McCall's couriers had been intercepted carrying dispatches to General George Meade of the Pennsylvania Reserves, directing him to examine the roads leading to Leesburg. From the courier Colonel Evans also learned of the Federal position near Dranesville. Evans then decided to set a trap into which, hopefully, the Federals would conveniently blunder. The Confederates now kept a watchful eye.

In the meantime General Stone moved without delay to comply with his superior's orders. He planned to feign a movement across the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry with Gorman's brigade, while with his main force he began a flanking maneuver three and a half miles upriver at Smart's Mill Ford. His hope was to catch the Confederate force in a pincer-like movement between his troops on the left and McCall's troops on the right. But everything started to go wrong!

First of all, General Stone sent out four companies of the 15th Massachusetts under Colonel Charles Devens to reinforce Harrison's Island, a jumping off point in the middle of the Potomac River opposite a location in Virginia called Ball's Bluff, a steep ridge overlooking the river. Gorman had made an artillery demonstration at Edwards' Ferry and had even sent a small party across the river and they had been already been recalled. General Stone at this juncture was unsure if Gorman's demonstration had had the desired effect on the Confederates. Were they still in Leesburg? Stone decided to order Colonel Devens to send a hand-picked party of about 20 men across from Harrison's Island to reconnoiter the area towards Leesburg. But by the time Colonel Devens could be located (he apparently had been at church services) the day was passing and it was nearly sunset when Devens chose a Captain Chase Philbrick from Company H of the 15th Massachusetts to lead the recon party. Once again the fates intervened. The crossing of the river required two hours and was uneventful, but the ingredients were there for another piece of the disaster.

Ball's Bluff, a site with extremely rocky terrain, a precarious eighty foot high cliff, had been left unguarded by the Confederates because of the challenges it would present to an attacking force. Stone knew this as recon parties had previously been at the location and knew of an old cowpath leading up from the shore. This is the path that the recon party was to reconnoiter. However, with 20 untried volunteers, an inexperienced captain on his first nighttime reconnaissance, on a foggy moonlit night in enemy territory, and with orders to remain undetected, things can go terribly awry. The recon party walking along the old cow path sees what appears to be about thirty tents in a field, with no sentries! What luck! The party hurries back to Harrison's Island and reports to Colonel Devens what they have seen. An aide rushes the information to General Stone at Edwards' Ferry. Anticipating what he termed "a very nice little military chance" Stone decides to send Devens and his command across the Potomac from his position on Harrison's Island, with the intent of destroying the undefended Confederate camp. Colonel Raymond Lee and his 20th Massachusetts will also go along as support. Unknown to the Union commander, things continue to go horribly wrong!

It's after midnight when Colonel Devens sets out with his detachment. They find the Potomac to be swollen after recent rains and with a treacherous current. Devens has only three boats with which to cross his 400 troops, three boats that have a capacity to cross only 27 men at a time. It is not until 4:00 am on October 21 that Devens and his men are across the river, and followed by Colonel Lee and his Bay-Staters. The men are tired, it's still dark and they have to struggle up a narrow path to the top of the bluff. Moving a mile inland Devens discovers that there is no rebel camp! The tents that Captain Philbrick's inexperienced men had seen were a stand of trees! Continuing on Devens comes upon Leesburg which appears to have been abandoned by the Confederates. What to do? His orders didn't cover this contingency. He sends a courier back to Stone at Edwards' Ferry with word of what his troops had found, with the message that they could maintain their position and, if reinforced, would move on to Leesburg and take the town. Although Stone finds merit in Devens' plan he's unwilling to rush his untried command out on this venture.

Here fate again steps in. One of Stone's brigade commanders is Colonel Edward D. Baker, politician and soldier, and dear friend of President Lincoln and his family. Edward Baker was a senator from Oregon and long-time friend of the Lincolns who had called their second son Eddie as Baker's namesake. Baker's military experience was minimal, and he was totally unqualified and unprepared for the role in which we was about to be cast. Colonel Baker has arrived at Edwards' Ferry coincident with Devens' messenger, and General Stone seizes the opportunity to send a force in support of Devens. He instructs Baker to take part of his command, the 1st California (71st Pennsylvania), and proceed to Harrison's Island. Once there he's to size up the situation. If he feels that Devens' position is untenable, he's authorized to order a retreat. But, if, on the other hand, he determines that an attack on Leesburg is feasible, he also has the authority to order that attack. Baker is de facto commander of the venture.

While Colonel Baker was making his way from Edwards' Ferry to Harrison's Island, another piece of the disaster was falling into place. Devens and his men had been discovered by elements of the Confederate 17th Mississippi. As more companies of rebels come in line on Devens' flank he's forced to fall back. About a quarter mile behind Devens' covering force, the 20th Massachusetts, was the ridge rising sixty to eighty feet above the Potomac, the fateful ridge known as Ball's Bluff.

The situation had become untenable, but no one saw it. Lack of military experience and single-minded aggressiveness combined to set the stage for disaster.

As Colonel Baker arrives at Harrison's Island he immediately begins to send additional troops across the Potomac, but he makes a serious blunder in judgment. As the commanding officer he fails to make a determination of the true situation on the Virginia side of the river. He doesn't even try. Clearly, given his strong martial attitude, it is doubtful whether he would have wanted to withdraw Devens' command under any circumstances. So, while Devens' men are fighting for their lives, Baker is personally supervising the crossing of his command, instead of crossing over himself to take command of the field of battle. In performing an activity that could have easily and more properly been performed by one of his lieutenants he shows his inexperience and lack of skill in determining priorities.

When Colonel Baker finally reaches the Virginia shore in the middle of the afternoon, Devens has already been under attack for more than seven hours. On locating Devens he exclaims, "Colonel Devens, I congratulate you upon the splendid manner in which your regiment has behaved this morning. I think we better form the line here, and prepare to receive them here, and you shall have the right of the line." Baker then deploys his troops, the 15th and 20th Massachusetts, the 42nd New York and the 1st California (71st Pennsylvania), in what has been termed "a masterpiece of incompetence". There is no depth to his line, several regiments are deployed facing each other at right angles, and there is a wooded ridge to their front, a ridge that should the Confederates occupy would be disastrous to the federal line.

So the federal line is formed with a ridge in front, deep ravines on either flank, and a steep bluff behind. Another element of the disaster is in place.

Finally there are the Confederates who are aware of a good deal of the Union plans. Colonel Evans is faced with three Union threats. On one side he has General McCall's advance on Dranesville, on another he has Stone's sortie out from Edwards' Ferry, and finally he has Devens' and Baker's crossing from Harrison's Island. Evans correctly determines that the main Union focus is with the Harrison's Island crossing, and he feeds additional troops into the fray, under the tactical command of Colonel Eppa Hunton of the 8th Virginia. While having no actual combat experience himself, Hunton expertly deploys the troops as they become available to him and captures the ridge overlooking the federal position. By 3:00 the battle is fully engaged. Colonel Hunton rises to the occasion, but Colonel Baker is sadly out of his element. Although brave to a fault, he's totally lacking in knowledge of military tactics. The struggle continues for an additional hour when Colonel Baker is shot several times and falls mortally wounded. In the confusion that follows, Colonel Devens and Colonel Lee of the 20th Massachusetts confer and determine that their position is no longer tenable and they decide to retreat. At this point Colonel Milton Cogswell of the 42nd New York joins them, and, as senior commander on the field, assumes command. He correctly interprets the situation and declares that retreat across the Potomac is virtually impossible given the condition of the river and the lack of boats to transport the troops. The three boats available are already filled with wounded being evacuated from the field. In addition, the pursuing Confederates would reach the bluff long before the retreating Federals would be able to recross the river.

Colonel Cogswell directs the federal force to try and escape towards Edwards' Ferry in the hope of meeting up with Gorman's brigade. The attempt fails. Lee and Devens' plan is now the only option available, other than outright surrender. And now the debacle nears completion.

A retreat is ordered and the regiments break ranks for the rear. All military order is gone. Down the bluff they run, slide, and tumble. Some reach the Potomac and try to swim across and escape. Many are drowned because they can't swim or because they're too weighed down with their uniforms and accouterments. Others throw off their coats and shoes. They throw away their weapons. They try to escape. Many try to crowd into the few available boats, boats that are already filled to capacity with the wounded and dying. The boats capsize and dump their human cargo into the cold swollen Potomac. In the meantime the men of the 15th and 20th Massachusetts who had been ordered to cover the withdrawal of the rest of the troops are overrun and many are forced to surrender. The pursuing Confederates are now on top of the fleeing Federals and they fire down from the bluff, killing and wounding many as they try to escape. By now it's dusk and the disaster is complete.

Colonel Stone is not informed of the disaster until after 6:00 p.m. At 6:45 he telegraphs to General McClellan the news of the death of Colonel Baker, "Ned" Baker, the president's friend. At 9:45 he again telegraphs his commander, this time with news of the defeat. McClellan replies, but doesn't grasp the extent of the disaster. Stone and his officers try desperately to find out what had gone wrong, but all they hear are conflicting reports. Harrison's Island and the Maryland shore were in turmoil and it would be morning before order could be restored to the various commands, and it would be morning before the full extent of the debacle would be known. At 10:45 General Stone sits down and telegraphs the President and offers what he knows of another defeat of his army.

Lincoln is at McClellan's headquarters when Stone's 6:45 telegram comes over the wire. When the news is broken to him, he staggers out of the office and stumbles home to the White House. The death of Ned Baker has hit him hard.

So what is the legacy of Ball's Bluff? Was it just another battle, another early defeat for the Union forces?

The human toll of the battle is small in comparison with other battles yet to come. For the Union side the final casualty reports listed 49 killed, 158 wounded, and 714 captured or missing. A total of 921 casualties out of a force of 1640 engaged, an incredible and horrifying 56%. Bodies were reported as washing up along the Potomac as far away as Washington over the next few weeks. There are sad stories of the bodies of comrades washing up together, comrades who tried to save each other from the angry waters of the Potomac. Every time the newspapers reported that another body had been found, the Northern people, and Congress, were again reminded of the disaster

For the Confederate side the casualty figures are easier to bear, 33 killed, 115 wounded and 1 missing, for a total of 149 casualties out of 1605 engaged, a more palatable 9%.

How could this be? Almost immediately the government began to look for responsibility. Who had let this happen?

Out of this disaster at Ball's Bluff came the infamous Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. Suffice it to say this committee would have an impact on every decision made by every commander for the remainder of the war. Two camps became apparent -- many volunteer officers voiced the opinion that the fault belonged to the career officer General Charles Stone. To the officers of the Regular Army the fault could only lie with the inexperienced civilian Senator/Colonel Edward Baker. Others pointed fingers at General George McClellan, but he was too far removed from the action, and still too popular to have the charges stick to him.

On December 5, 1861 Ohio Republican Senator Benjamin Wade introduced a resolution calling for the formation of a three-man committee with powers to subpoena individuals and papers associated with the disaster not only at Ball's Bluff, but also at Ball Run. This led to another resolution called for by Senator James Grimes of Iowa to establish a seven-man committee, comprised of three senators and four congressmen with even broader powers, powers to investigate the entire conduct of the war. The resolution was passed in the Senate with a vote of thirty-three to three. It was then unanimously approved by the House of Representatives.

The Joint Committee lost no time in interviewing everyone connected with the debacle at Ball's Bluff . It used its broad investigative powers to its fullest measure. General Charles Stone was one of the first commanders to be interviewed, and he felt his testimony truthful and helpful. Unfortunately for General Stone he was the man chosen to be the scapegoat. The Committee sought out testimony, whether honest or dishonest, that tended to incriminate Stone, and it gave little credence to any testimony that in any way criticized Colonel Balcer or the other participants. Baker, while the actual commander on the field, was not there to testify, and after all he was Senator Baker, one of their own.

The Committee seized on testimony, much of it patently false, that accused Stone of treason for communicating with the enemy. Anyone who would testify against the loyalty of General Stone was sought out. While the original intent of the Committee was to investigate the conduct of officers during specific battles, the focus turned almost exclusively to trying to destroy the reputation of General Charles Stone. Why was this? Stone it seems had gone against the powerful Massachusetts Republicans when he declared that Massachusetts men in the field were subject to his commands, and not to the commands of Massachusetts Governor John Andrew. Andrew for his part instructed Senator Charles Sumner to denounce Stone in a speech before the United States Senate, a speech which led Stone to challenge Sumner to a duel. While the duel never materialized, the animosity remained. In his letter to Sumner Stone challenged "There can hardly be better proof that a soldier in the field is faithfully performing his duty, than the fact that while he is receiving the shot of the public enemy in front he is at the same time receiving the vituperation of a well known coward from a safe distance in the rear."

On the morning of February 9, 1862 Stone was arrested at his Washington residence and sent to Fort Lafayette in New York Harbor where he remained, untried, for 189 days. No formal charges were ever preferred against him, although the Committee obviously questioned his loyalty. This is the same General Stone to whom the safety and well-being of the newly-elected President Lincoln and his Capital had been entrusted just one year before! Curiously, Lincoln chose not to involve himself in the affair, whether or not because of the death of his friend Baker is subject to speculation. Finally, it took an act of Congress to secure General Stone's release. An amendment on a bill passed on July 17, 1862 declared it illegal to hold an officer under arrest for more than thirty days without a trial. To add insult to injury the War Department took the law literally and didn't release General Stone until an additional thirty days had passed, that is on August 16, 1862. As a good soldier, following his release, General Stone again reported for duty, and served in several other capacities during the war. But his reputation and career had been ruined. Ironically, after the war Charles Stone worked as an mining engineer, and then as an officer in the Egyptian Army. He returned to the United States and served as the chief engineer on the construction of the pedestal for the Statue of Liberty, which guarded the same harbor in which he had been imprisoned. He died shortly thereafter in 1887.

What other legacies are a result of this "small battle"? A number of well-known Americans were casualties of the action at Ball's Bluff. In addition to the death of Senator Edward Baker, Major Paul Joseph Revere, grandson of the hero of the Revolutionary War was captured and moved to a Confederate prison. He was exchanged the next February. Lieutenant Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the future jurist, participated in and was wounded at Ball's Bluff. He recovered at home, and again rejoined his unit, the 20th Massachusetts.

Ball's Bluff also decided the fate of Winfield Scott, the aged Commander in Chief of the Army. He was soon replaced by General George B. McClellan.

Another casualty of the battle was the little-known Lieutenant John "Willie" Grout of the 15th Massachusetts. He was wounded while trying to cross the river, and subsequently drowned, his body surfacing several miles downstream. He was sent back to his grieving family in Worcester where he was given a grand funeral procession attended by many of the residents of his hometown. Willie Grout would have remained another of the countless casualties of the war, long forgotten, if it had not been for a friend Henry S. Washburn, who eulogized Willie in a verse that was published in a Worcester newspaper and later set to music by George S. Root, the most celebrated songwriter of the war. The ballad, entitled "The Vacant Chair", celebrated Willie Grout and became one of the most popular songs of the war, on both sides of the conflict.

Novelist Herman Melville near the close of the war published a series of poems entitled "Battle-Pieces", of which one, simply called "Ball's Bluff', honored the young men who died for a mistake.

The final legacy of the battle is the Ball's Bluff Battlefield and National Cemetery, the country's smallest national cemetery. There are 25 gravestones, all but one marked "unknown", representing some forty to fifty Union casualties who are buried in a mass grave. The only marked grave belongs to one Private James Allen of the 15th Massachusetts.

Ball's Bluff. A small battle. A long shadow.* A seemingly insignificant military action that had repercussions immediately after and that casts its legacy down to the present.