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 Posted: Sun Sep 21st, 2008 05:07 pm
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samhood
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Joined: Tue Sep 6th, 2005
Location: West Virginia USA
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Ken:

Hood had left most of his artillery at Columbia, along with two of three divisions of SD Lee's Corps, to make Schofield think there was a general attack while Cheatham and Stewart's Corps' made the grand flank march to Spring Hill on Nov. 29. The artillery barage froze Schofield temporarily, allowing Hood to get the jump on him to Spring Hill.

On the late afternoon of Nov 30, with only 2 hours of daylight remaining, the artillery and SD Lee's two divisions had not yet arrived at Franklin from Columbia, having had to march 12-15 miles further than Cheatham and Stewarts' two corps.

In short, Hood would have had to wait 4-5 hours for his artillery to arrive at Franklin, and by that time it would be dark, too late to launch an attack, and Schofield's army would have been safely behind the fortifications of Nashville after an overnight's march.  As Hood pointed out, he preferred to fight Schofield at Franklin, where he had only a few hours to fortify, than at Nashville, where the Federals had been fortifying for three years.

As for Schofield's credibility, yes, he was a self promotor, but his description of the situation at Franklin was factually correct, and corroborated by several other memoirists...Union and Confederate. (I didn't bother posting them.)

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