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 Posted: Sun Sep 4th, 2011 01:32 pm
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Old Blu
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Pender, now that I have read Krick's book, I am planning on visiting again with my movie camera.  A lot of the pictures I took are where the gate was located and I didn't realize that was the hot spot for cannon.  That is kind of creepy. I am a little curious why there wasn't a buildup of infantry in the corner of those woods back out of sight anticipating an attack by the Union army to follow the cannon fire.

Do you think that is another goof by the invincible Stonewall? :(

Also, it is noted when the Union attack came they ran out of steam just before reaching Early.  Do you see it that way?

For you.

http://bhere.com/plugugly/1862/6209cma.htm

Last edited on Sun Sep 4th, 2011 01:40 pm by Old Blu



 Posted: Sun Sep 4th, 2011 04:44 pm
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Old Blu wrote: Pender, now that I have read Krick's book, I am planning on visiting again with my movie camera.  A lot of the pictures I took are where the gate was located and I didn't realize that was the hot spot for cannon.  That is kind of creepy. I am a little curious why there wasn't a buildup of infantry in the corner of those woods back out of sight anticipating an attack by the Union army to follow the cannon fire. Do you think that is another goof by the invincible Stonewall? :( Also, it is noted when the Union attack came they ran out of steam just before reaching Early.  Do you see it that way? For you. http://bhere.com/plugugly/1862/6209cma.htm Old Blu, Stonewall Jackson said later after the battle of Cedar Mountain that it was "the most successful of his exploits." I would assume that Jackson did not have the men to mass in the woods till Hills men would arrive. Looking at Jacksons lines I would think he could have spared some men from Forno and Trimble, but I suspect he left them in place to hold his right flank. IMO I think Jacksons mistake was not waiting for A.P. Hill's division to come up before making the attack. Then he would have had the men to place in the woods anticipating the attack of the union army. Ironically as the battle was to be another victory for Stonewall, is how it would come to be. For union general Banks was intent on attacking Jackson to redeem himself from his thrashing gave by Old Jack. A.P. Hill's last minute arrival due to Jacksons new orders of march that he(A.P. Hill) was not aware of. Just amazing how all of this little details shaped the battle.

When the union attack reached Early I think it still had quite abit of steam. As any gets when it is routing the enemy. Garnett and Tallaferro were on the run. I believe Early reinforced by Thomas of the light division took the steam out of Crawford. The great mistake of  Banks was to sent Crawford in unsupported.

Thanks for the map, Pender 

Last edited on Sun Sep 4th, 2011 05:28 pm by pender



 Posted: Sun Sep 4th, 2011 05:34 pm
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I would think with a cannon barrage lasting for 2 or more hours would have been plenty of time to get Hill moving.  Just some thoughts.



 Posted: Sun Sep 4th, 2011 05:46 pm
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Old Blu, I know Jackson was looking for Hill when he did come up. I am unaware if he had sent out messengers for Hill to hurry. Are you?



 Posted: Sun Sep 4th, 2011 06:36 pm
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pender wrote: Old Blu, I know Jackson was looking for Hill when he did come up. I am unaware if he had sent out messengers for Hill to hurry. Are you?

I think he did.  I would have to go back and check.



 Posted: Sun Sep 4th, 2011 06:45 pm
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Here is a correct outline of what happened in accordance to Krick's book.  If you see any discrepancies let me know.

http://blueandgraytrail.com/event/Battle_of_Cedar_Mountain

Last edited on Sun Sep 4th, 2011 06:45 pm by Old Blu



 Posted: Sun Sep 4th, 2011 09:32 pm
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Old Blu, I think I have found the cause of Hill not being there sooner. First off was the confusion of the preceding day. As you know Jackson was not very good at giving his command decisions. Hill was unaware of them as was Taliaferro, when Winder was killed. Hills orders were to march, that was about all Hill knew. Second was reconnaissance, Jackson failed to reveal either the position or the strength of the enemy until contact was made. Third the cannon fire you mentioned began before even Winder and Ewell were deployed, from my understanding they had a hard time of breaking off the marching column's to make battle lines. Alot of the connonading at first that went on was to help these men get into battle lines. Guns were brought up and artillary fire was used to screen the maneuvering of the troops into combat positions. Hill was not up when the fighting started. He was not far behind, however, having determinedly pushed the light division throughout the day to close the gap between it and the leading divisions of Winder and Ewell. So I believe even though things worked out for Jackson upon the arrival of the light division. He went in to this fight blind, kind of like Lee at Gettysburg, except on a smaller scale.

Old Blu, I know I had asked you about Penders position on the battle field. So forgive me if I ask another. Some of us are not as close to them as you. You have got me wanting to come see Cedar Mt. Battle field. But I have done promised my wife Charleston this year.(Fort Sumter) Had promised her last year and ended up going to Sharpsburg. Can you pin point the position of captain Willie Pegram's and W.B. Hardy's batteries. They should be over on the shoulder of the hill from Earlys position. Early saved them from being captured.

Pender

 

 



 Posted: Sun Sep 4th, 2011 10:56 pm
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pender wrote: Old Blu, I think I have found the cause of Hill not being there sooner. First off was the confusion of the preceding day. As you know Jackson was not very good at giving his command decisions. Hill was unaware of them as was Taliaferro, when Winder was killed. Hills orders were to march, that was about all Hill knew. Second was reconnaissance, Jackson failed to reveal either the position or the strength of the enemy until contact was made. Third the cannon fire you mentioned began before even Winder and Ewell were deployed, from my understanding they had a hard time of breaking off the marching column's to make battle lines. Alot of the connonading at first that went on was to help these men get into battle lines. Guns were brought up and artillary fire was used to screen the maneuvering of the troops into combat positions. Hill was not up when the fighting started. He was not far behind, however, having determinedly pushed the light division throughout the day to close the gap between it and the leading divisions of Winder and Ewell. So I believe even though things worked out for Jackson upon the arrival of the light division. He went in to this fight blind, kind of like Lee at Gettysburg, except on a smaller scale.

Old Blu, I know I had asked you about Penders position on the battle field. So forgive me if I ask another. Some of us are not as close to them as you. You have got me wanting to come see Cedar Mt. Battle field. But I have done promised my wife Charleston this year.(Fort Sumter) Had promised her last year and ended up going to Sharpsburg. Can you pin point the position of captain Willie Pegram's and W.B. Hardy's batteries. They should be over on the shoulder of the hill from Earlys position. Early saved them from being captured.

Pender

  Pender, I am going to try to get back over there this coming week.  I will be traveling around the country with an author and she is doing a special article on General Early.
As I get those pictures I will make sure to get some shots of the total battle field.  When I took the pictures I have, there is nothing there to give a hint.  So I need to take more pictures. 

I tried to get some pictures of the battlefield off Cedar Mountain but they did work out too well. There was a new growth of pine tree in the way.  That is why I want to go back over there.

Blu

 

Pender, I am going to try to get back over there this coming week.  I will be traveling around the country with an author and she is doing a special article on General Early.
As I get those pictures I will make sure to get some shots of the total battle field.  When I took the pictures I have, there is nothing there to give a hint.  So I need to take more pictures. 

I tried to get some pictures of the battlefield off Cedar Mountain but they did work out too well. There was a new growth of pine tree in the way.  That is why I want to go back over there.

Blu

Last edited on Sun Sep 4th, 2011 10:57 pm by Old Blu



 Posted: Sun Sep 11th, 2011 11:31 am
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Pender, I'm going back to Cedar Mountain today.  I plan on working all over the battle field.  I will post some pictures here if everything goes accordingly.

Here is a Hotchkiss Map I located.

http://friendsofcedarmountain.org/images/sketch.jpg

Blue

Last edited on Sun Sep 11th, 2011 03:03 pm by Old Blu



 Posted: Thu Sep 22nd, 2011 04:46 pm
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I have a question to the members of the board on Lee's army after Chancellorsville. My question is, why did Lee change his tatics? I started to give this question it's own thread, but the Light Divsion is mentioned so much I will use this one. I have pondered this alot so I am going to ask the members. I will be reading Martin Schenck's book" UP CAME HILL." This will give you the understanding why I have asked this question. It is rather long so please bear with me. Starting on page 290 Schenck say's "A brief review of the six campaigns in question illustrates the different methods by which the union troops were forced to move. It is to be noted that the controlling factor is not necessarily confederate movement , although this was several times the device employed to set off the enemy movement, which resulted each time in union failure. At the start of the Seven Days, Hill was forced to open the campaign by attacking a defensive line set up by Porter along Beaver Dam. Lee's plan to force union movement, however, had been based upon Jackson's hitting Porter's flank from the north, thus causing him to withdraw in front of Hill. Jackson's delay prevented this from being done on Lee's schedule. Nevertheless, when Porter was finally forced to pull out, Longstreet and Hill followed in pursuit along the union flank, literally herding McClellan's army toward the James. Thereafter, the Battles of Gaines' Mill and Frayser's Farm were waged against union troops that were kept off balance because they were forced to protect the constant retrogressive movement of their supply trains. At Malvern Hill, McClellan made a temporary stand and had his only successful day of the Seven. Nevertheless, he was now in retreat and was committed to a withdrawal to the James, where his supplies were accumulating. The battle of Slaughter's Mountain, known in the north as Cedar Mountain, was actually the start of the Second Manassas campaign. It was nevertheless, a complete battle in itself and it occurred some time before the fighting around Manassas, many miles to the north. Here again, the Federals were on the move when they were encountered. Jackson ran into Banks somewhat by chance. Banks was outnumbered badly and should have withdrawn. Nevertheless, he elected to engage in a head on fight. This was a battle of movement on both sides, with the issue being decided when Powell Hill raced up in time to put the union troops to rout. The actual Second Battle of Manassas was a masterpiece of maneuver planned by Lee, with its opening phases performed by Jackson, and with Longstreet arriving on the scene in time to seal the victory. Jackson marched around Pope's flank and got behind him. Pope was then forced to turn around and move against the concealed and entrenched confederates. The Light Division magnificently held the left, where the main union effort was made. Then Longstreet came up through Throughfare Gap and smashed the flank of Pope's massed line which was concentrating in movement against Jackson. Along the Antietam, Lee established a defensive line and let McClellan attack. This strategy nearly proved a fatal mistake for Lee, because McClellan moved in with an overwhelming force, which would have destroyed the army of Northern Virginia had not A.P. Hill arrived at the last possible moment and charged into Burnside's moving and exposed flank. Hill's attack broke up the left phase of the union attack and permitted Lee to extricate the rest of the army. At Fredericksburg, Lee's tatics were somewhat different, but they resulted in forcing the union troops to move where he wanted them. Longstreet was firmly entrenched on Maryes Heights. Jackson was deployed in a semicircle on the right. Burnside moved into the same type of viselike formation as Pope had at Manassas. The result was a resounding defeat for the army of the Potomac. The Light Division bore the brunt of the attack on the confederate right. Finally, at Chancellorsville, Lee and Jackson conjured another great flanking movement that suprised Hooker and knocked him so far off balance that he had to move out of previously planned positions to attempt to counteract Jackson's attack. Again he was outmaneuvered so badly that he never was able to put a great part of his army into action. Hooker lost a Battle that he should of won against less talented opposition. As usual, A.P.Hill's Division was in the thick of the battle, sustaining the heaviest losses on the Confederate side. The strategic pattern by which Lee forced the enemy to move to its own destruction in these six campaigns was discontinued after Chancellorsville. The tide turned a few weeks later in Gettysburg. There Lee met his first great defeat. There the southern victories that had spawned the likes of Vallandigham, and had caused such great consternation, even among the most loyal elements in the north, came to an abrupt end. The end occurred at Gettysburg because Lee adopted new tactics. He attacked superior strength in strong defensive positions. Meade was premitted to dig in and make preparations that were sufficient to smash a suicidal attack, just as Lee had done at Fredericksburg. The union won, and assumed the initiative as Grant arrived on the scene to conduct the last stages of the war against Lee. After Gettysburg, with one notable exception, the Confederates were kept on the move and were unable to employ the enemy movement pattern that had been so successful from the Seven Days through Chancellorsville. The one exception was at Cold Harbor, where Lee manuvered Grant into attacking extremely well-fortified positions. The result was a terrible defeat for the north with the most concentrated casualty rate of the war. By then, however it was to late. Lee had to retreat to Petersburg to stand a long siege that ultimately led to the surrender at Appomattox. The immediate question, as one reviews these six battles, is why did Lee change his successful campaign pattern? No one can safely attribute the great Confederate leader's reversal of policy to any single factor. There are a number of obvious ones, however. For one thing, in Meade, Lee met a far sounder general than he had faced, at least in Pope, Burnside, or Hooker. Another factor was the absence of Stuart's cavalry at Gettysburg. This practically eliminated his intelligence gathering agency and kept him from being able to anticipate Meade's movements and thus entrap him as he had ensnared the other Union commanders. The inception of the Battle of Gettysburg was an accident, which good information would have prevented. This was not true of the six preceding battles, except possibly Slaughter's Mountain. Many other sound reasons have been advanced for Lee's failure at Gettysburg in the countless words that have been written about this battle. The fact that stands out, however is that Lee at Gettysburg, and in subsequent campaigns, did not have at his command the same army that had been so victorious during the previous twelve months. Jackson was no longer with him. The men of the Light Division were divided into two parts, each competently commanded, but the whole lacking the cohesiveness and fierce pride of the original unit when it was under the direct command of A.P.Hill. Then too, the new three -corps army was different and more unwieldy than the old two wings, especially from the command viewpoint, as there were now three instead of two elements to be coordinated and given orders. Besides, neither A.P. Hill nor Ewell had a chance to gain experience in higher command before going into action at Gettysburg. Lee, therefore, was not only deprived of Jackson's counsel and unique flanking ability, but he also had two newly organized corps, led by inexperienced men, to take the place of a single streamlined command that Jackson had handled so well, at least after he got over the spell of the Seven Days. The old Light Division was not there. Tell A.P.Hill to come up, would now be a meaningless order. Had Jackson been at Gettysburg, it is impossible to believe that Meade would have been able to set up his defenses on Culp's Hill and along Cemetery Ridge. The Jackson of Manassas and Chancellosville would have had the Light Division in the town and smashing at Meade's troops while they were recoiling from the first encounter. This would have prevented Meade from organizing his defenses as Ewell permitted him to do. Ewell lost the advantage by waiting for orders which Lee never issued. Jackson would have held the initiative. Robert E. Lee, accustomed to Jackson, might well have thought further orders to Ewell unnecessary under the circumstances. In any event, after the first day at Gettysburg, Lee found himself in an unaccustomed position and without some of the tools he had previously employed. He then made the same paramount mistake that his opponents had made on the other occasions. He did the moving against the superior force in a superior position. Pickett's charge is history.

 Now that you can see my question in more detail, I ask do you agree?

 What is your assessment on Schenck's notes here? I must say I agree fully with him.

 In other words what is the difference in the ANV up to Chancellorsville, then after?

Pender

     

Last edited on Thu Sep 22nd, 2011 05:00 pm by pender



 Posted: Fri Sep 23rd, 2011 05:56 am
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Wow!
That is a lot of fodder to chew on Pender! But to your point, why did Lee change his tactics after Chancellorsville?
I'm not as well versed as many of the scholars and analysts that I am being introduced to on this site, but I do have some informed opinions and I'm always interested in discussing the many facets of our "War between the States".
I think Lee and Jackson were a powerful team to contend with on the battlfield. They understood the huge payoff potential of calculated risk taking. And they were not afraid to rise to the occasion.
This venturous teamwork, combined with the stability of Longstreets Corp, fostered a winning (can do) attitude amongst the subordinate commanders and their commands.
Thus, the string of victories, that you so eloquently noted, were attained by the Army of Northern Virginia during the 1st half of the war.
After Chancellorsville, General Jackson was no longer in General Lees toolbox.
The restructuring of the Army into 3 Corps, (2 with Commanders of unknown capacity in those positions), was a huge burden upon General Lee. Initially, he probably did not realize how involved he needed to be in Corp ops decision making.
As Division Commanders AP Hill an Ewell were aggressive fighters, but they were always under Jacksons close scrutiny.
On the other hand, as Corps commanders at Gettysburg, General Lee allowed them a free hand that they had not been used to. I think this "sudden" latitude in decision making shackled AP HILL and Ewell into an overcautious approach to any given matter.
At Gettysburg, General Lee needed to make a statement to the world. It was a do or die moment for the South. The ultimate gamble for the Army of Northern Virginia. Yet, General Lee did not have the other half of the risk taking equation with him. General Jackson was dead.
Without Stuarts eyes and after the 1st day at Gettysburg, I think General Lee began to realize the full import of his situation.
He needed to rely on Longstreets Corps for stability, yet Lee himself needed to micromanage the battlefield.
Personally, I think Longstreet had good ideas on how to defeat the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg, but General Lee, noting the fragmentation of the ANV, probably elected to use a more direct hand in leading the Army. (essentially, my way or the hiway)
After the loss at Gettysburg, I think General Lee could read the writing on the wall. The great gamble did not payoff, so it then became a war of attrition.
In the later years, General Lee often stood in the gap of his fragmented, ill and constantly shuffled Corps commanders.
Instead of winning battles by taking calculated risks, General Lee now fortified and waited for the Yanks.

So what does this all mean?
I would venture to say that without the teamwork of General Lee and General Jackson, the ANV lost a huge advantage of bewildering the Yanks. Being at such an multi-faceted disadvantage to the Northern Aggressors, the Southerners needed the enterprising leadership of Generals like Lee and Jackson to more equalize the equation.
As noted before, without the Lee and Jackson risk taking component and Longstreets WARHORSE stability the Army of Northern Virginia would be a different animal. That animal was created during Gettysburg.



 Posted: Fri Sep 23rd, 2011 01:27 pm
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Mark
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I think that sgtredleg pretty much has it right. Lee couldn't pull off his tactical offensives because his subordinates were not up to it. Longstreet was not his usual self at Gettysburg, and got wounded early in the Wilderness. Stuart got himself killed right before Spotsylvania. AP Hill, Ewell and Anderson were simply not the commanders that Longstreet and Jackson were. They were great division commanders, but there is a large difference a division and a corps. Later on, Early was a sound corps commander, but he was no Jackson. Quite simply the ANV bled itself out of quality corps commanders. Hope that helps.

Mark



 Posted: Sat Sep 24th, 2011 09:06 pm
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sgtredleg and Mark, Thank you for the reply. I found them very helpful. Had been wondering if alot of the folk out there had the same ideas on the ANV up to Chancellorsville and after. When it comes to dealing with the ANV without Stonewall after Chancellorsville it seems to fall in the category of the what ifs. But the fact does remain that after the death of Jackson the ANV was not the same.

Especially when it came to attacking the troop movement mentioned above. There are those that claim the Confederacy was doomed the night the Light Division mistook their Commander for Union cavalry and shot him. I dont know, that is another what if. But in many ways it does look that way. But there is the western theater that some times gets over looked. Quite possibly if Jackson had lived he would have been sent west. I could not see Jackson being passed over in favor of Hood.

Also another fact that gets over looked is the lesser known commanders killed and wounded up till and after Gettysburg. The Division and Brigade commanders, down to the Colonel, Major and captain. And also the private, so many gone and irreplacable. The Light Division's casualties alone up to Gettysburg is staggering, as is the rest of the Confederate army.

One last thing I would like to add is Gen. Longstreet. I do not lay any of the blame on Old Pete for the failure at Gettysburg. I would tend to think if any of us were in his shoes we also would have to try and talk Lee out of such a desperate endeavor. IMO I think Longstreet was kind of slow hoping Lee would change his mind. After all it was Longstreet's Corp entrenched on the heights at Fredericksburg. Again IMO I think Jackson was in his element on the offensive, such as flanking the enemy. Like wise I think Longstreet was in his element on the defensive. Though he did great at 2nd Manassas and Chickamauga. I believe his speciality is defense.

Thanks again fellows, Pender

 



 Posted: Tue Sep 27th, 2011 09:05 am
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Another place where Stonewall pulled another flanking march was Ox Hill.  (Chantilly)
Looks like that was his MO.:)



 Posted: Tue Sep 27th, 2011 12:50 pm
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I think it was everyone's MO... Jackson was just better at actually accomplishing it!



 Posted: Tue Sep 27th, 2011 05:01 pm
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sgtredleg, What good books do you have on the Light Division? Are there any members out there that could recommend some good books on the Light Division?

Pender

Last edited on Tue Sep 27th, 2011 05:04 pm by pender



 Posted: Wed Sep 28th, 2011 04:34 pm
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pender wrote: sgtredleg, What good books do you have on the Light Division? Are there any members out there that could recommend some good books on the Light Division?

Pender

Pender. Robertson's book about A.P. Hill would be a good book for that unless you already have it.

Blu



 Posted: Wed Sep 28th, 2011 09:35 pm
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Thanks for the suggestion Old Blu. But I already own a copy of Robertson's book on A.P. Hill. It is one of the books I have liked so well I have read it more than once. Robertson's book on Stonewall Jackson is also very good. Both offer a look into the Light Division. I try to find books on the men associatied with the Light Division, though the book may not deal specifcally with the Division, it helps you learn more about them and what they are doing. One of the best things I have found on them is their regimental histories. I copied them off at the library out of Clarks histories of the several regiments and battalions from N.C. That is some of the best info I have found. Wish I had the histories of all the other states that were in the Light Division. Not sure if there is any such as Clarks compiled histories of N.C. troops. I have been wanting to read Foxes red clay to richmond, but have not gotten around to ordering it yet. The Light Division's Georgians ought to give me a little more insight. If you have any more suggestions feel free to give them to me.

Thanks Pender



 Posted: Thu Sep 29th, 2011 06:49 am
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Pender,
Unfortunately, most of my books concerning the Civil War are of a general flow and not unit or commander specfic in most cases.
I do have Red Clay to Richmond, John J. Fox, (about the 35th Ga) and I think it is a very well written book. It goes into much detail about the officers and men of the 35th GA. and incorporates Light Division actions into the storyline.
On June 16, 1862 the 35th Ga. was assigned to AP Hills Division. Soon after, in a communique, AP Hill referred to his Division as the Light Division and the name stuck.
That is one of my questions. Why the Light Division?
In my limited knowledge of the matter, a Light Division was lightly armed and moved quickly. With 6 standard brigades I would think AP Hills division may qualify as a Heavy Division. Can anyone enlighten me?
Additionally, the book reveals a sketchy form of evidence revealing how elements of Thoma's Brigade may have participated in Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg.
These and many other details of the Light Divisions units make for an interesting and educational read. I recommend Red Clay to Richmond to anyone with an interest in the GA. troops or the Light Division in general.
"To the gates of Richmond" (Stephen W. Sears). I thought was a good book revealing the role of the Light Division at Mechanicsville and Gaines Mill. Both devastating to AP Hills command.
"Burnsides Bridge", (Phillip Thomas Tucker) I thought was an excellent account of Toombs Ga. troops. But I do think it rather glorified Toomb's troops and minimized the Light Divisions role on Lee's right flank.
I really like Lee's Last Campaign, (Clifford Dowd). Many elements in that book intrigue me. As far as AP Hill goes, it reveals his faults as a Corp commander. However, it also expounds on the bravery and commitment of the recently reorganized Light Division. I just love it when AP Hill organizes a 125 Alabamian provost guard to defend a hole between the 2nd and 3rd Corps being penetrated by Wadsworth's yankee division.(HA!)
I'm just starting up on Lee's Lieutenants, so I'm looking forward to a great read there.
Any other good books out there I'm missing?



 Posted: Fri Sep 30th, 2011 01:05 am
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sgtredleg, Thanks for the reply. Why the Light Division is an interesting question. There is no record as to why Hill chose this name. But there is three explainations given in Schenck's book. 1 It is possible that Hill had in mind a title which would differentiate his division from that of Daniel Harvey Hill. 2 A.P. Hill a student of military history may of been inspired by the British Light Brigade, which eight years before had made itself immortal by its gallant charge at Balaclava in Crimea. 3 He gave the name intended on it being fast marching, hard hitting and a force to be used as a hammer. Maybe he knew what they could and did become. One member of the Light Division remarked, "We are lightly armed, lightly fed, but we march rapidly, fight frequently." 

I have read To the Gates of Richmond and Lee's last campaign, but have not read Burnsides Bridge. Thanks for the recommendations. As you are a decendant of a Light Division soldier I would highly recommend Martin Schenk's book "Up Came Hill" the story of the Light Division and its leaders. That is the best book based solely on the Light Division I have found. Just read Gerard A. Patterson's book " From blue to gray" the life of confederate general Cadumus M. Wilcox. There was not alot on the Light Division, but a little in sight on the latter years of the war, when Wilcox took command of the Light Division after Gettysburg. 

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