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 Posted: Thu May 15th, 2014 03:07 am
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Hellcat
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Ok, don't remember what I was watching that caused me to think of Sun Tzu's treatise but I did start thinking of it. I do know I wasn't watching the Military Channel (now American Heroes Channel) at the time, think it was some food thing on Travel Channel. At any rate, as I was thinking of the book I got to thinking of it in terms Civil War and thought it might serve as a starting point for discussion. I'm actually going to be using my copy which is a Shambhala Pocket Classics translated by Thomas Cleary. I was figuring we could look at various generals and how they maybe fit or fail at what Sun Tzu said over a thousand years before heir birth, either as a whole or in a particular battle or event.

I'll start this with Chapter 1 which Clearly calls Strategic Assessments:

Military action is important to the nation--it is the ground of death and life, the path of survival and destruction, so it is imperative to examine it.

Ok, so what Cleary says this means the location of the battlefield. The commander who gains the advantage on the battlefield lives (well, at least is more likely to win) and the commander who looses the advantage dies (or at least looses the battle). According to Cleary it is the military action itself that is the ground of life and death, not the battlefield itself. He the explains that the path of survival is a commander's ability to adjust to the unfolding battle and achieve victory.

This bit is just establishing things a little. Something to kinda keep in mind when thinking about talking points I think this next quote is really the discussion point.

Therefore measure in terms of five things, using these assessments to make comparisons, and thus find out hat the conditions are. The five things are the way, the weather, the terrain, the leadership, and discipline.

So basically five talking points there. Cleary says that a commander should assess these at headquarters in terms of both themselves and their opponent to determine who is superior and who will prevail in battle.
  1. The Way is basically explained as the people as having the same goals, the same aim, as the leadership. They share in death and life as the leadership does with no fear of danger. It's also described as humaneness and justice which an ancient political philosopher said means to govern properly. I.E. if a government is properly governed then the people feel close to their leaders and are ready to lay down their lives for them.

    On the Way I'm reminded a lot about the stories of Lee's surrender to Grant and how his soldiers felt they had let him down.

  2. Weather equals seasons. Cleary brings up how in ancient times soldiers, I'm guessing he means Roman soldiers though could mean any soldiers, would loose fingers and toes to frostbite when battling the Huns while soldiers fighting southern tribes were likely to die of plague. Cleary claims this was because of campaigns being carried out in the summer and winter months. Of course weather an also be the weather itself.

    So who really seems to have gotten this? I can' really say. I can think of Butler cleaning up in New Orleans and Norfolk to prevent diseases such as malaria and yellow fever from affecting the troops during the time of year the diseases regularly plagued those cities. And of course the infamous Mud March ultimately cost Burnside his command. But on the battlefield I can't really say I can think of any particular general who was really thinking about the weather or the seasons in general.

  3. Terrain is fairly understandable as the lay of the land. Commander's are supposed to assess terrain in terms of distances, how easy it is to travel over the terrain, dimension, and safety. In terms of distance it allows a commander to decide whether or not to take the direct route or try to find another, perhaps shorter or safer route to take. Ease of travel is used to determine if mounted troops or foot troops have an advantage. Dimension seems to be more about how defendable the terrain is as Cleary says knowing the dimension determines how many troops to use. Seems the more defensible the terrain is, the fewer troops you actually need to employ to repel an assault. And the safety of the terrain determines if you want to do battle there or not.

    On the subject of terrain I'm looking at several places at the moment. First I'm looking at Ball's Bluff. There was absolutely no reason for Federal forces to even attempt to engage Confederate forces at Ball's Bluff, the terrain was in their favor. First Federal troops would have to cross the Potomac by boat to land on a small strip of land at the base of the nearly 100 ft. high Ball's Bluff. Second, the only path up the side of the bluff was barely large enough for one man at a time. And third, at the top of the bluff was a wooded area that would provide a defensible position for Confederate forces. Obviously if you could only get a handful of men to the top of the cliff at a time then it doesn't offer ease of travel, and a narrow path isn't that safe for getting troop into a battle. Now in Clint Johnson's Civil War Blunders Johnson states that General Stone ordered Colonel Baker to cross the Potomac to determine if the men already there should be reinforced (a scouting party had been sent across the night before and had discovered rows of haystacks which they mistook for a Confederate camp without sentries present). Baker, however, merely began to reinforce the men across the river with an entire brigade rather than take the terrain into account and send forward skirmishers to determine exactly what he would face, which was a ring of fire around the small open area at the top of the bluff. Baker led an entire brigade into a trap because he apparently did not send out an advance force to determine exactly hat was faced. The terrain gave the advantage to the Confederates.

    Then there's Frederiksberg. Burnside wasted any advantages he had in his initial march south by then sitting and waiting for his precious pontoons in order to cross the Rappahannock. There's evidence that he could have crossed sooner if he had either backed up to the same crossings Hooker would use the following spring or if he had used a little known ford closer to where the Army of the Potomac eventually crossed. But by waiting he did effectively decide where the battle would take place and gave terrain advantages to Lee. Lee had the heights, and he had the distance in his favor as the Federal guns couldn't really reach his position to support the advancing infantry where as Lee's own artillery could fire down on the Federal troops.

    My next thought is Chancellorsville. Hooker took the heights, expecting Lee to come at him as Burnside had gone at Lee. But Hooker believed the Wilderness was impenetrable and thus his right flank had nothing to fear. We all know Jackson was able to find a way through the Wilderness and roll up Hooker's flank in a devastating flank attack that ultimately cost Jackson his life. So Jackson was looking at the distance Confederate troops would have to take under the Federal guns and he looked for an alternate route that allowed his troops a measure of safety. In this case both Hooker and Jackson seem to have been thinking about the effect of the terrain, but Hooker did not expect the Wilderness could be passed through and largely dismissed it.

  4. Leadership is described as intelligence, trustworthiness, humanenss, courage, and sternness. Intelligence is a mark of being able to develop a plan and to change it effectively. The old saying no plan survives initial contact with the enemy seems to me to be a rewording of that last part concerning intelligence. Cleary claims that trustworthiness means you make the people under you sure of either punishment or reward. Humaneness is love and compassion for the people under you. Courage is supposedly the ability to seize the opportunity for certain victory, although to me that would also seem a mark of intelligence. And sternness is the establishment of discipline within the ranks through the use of strict punishment.

    On the subject of humaneness I'm again drawn to Lee as the men did love him as he seemed as concerned for them as he was with defeating the Federal generals he faced. And they did come t love and respect him, although this wasn't always the case. Lee also seemed an intelligent man capable of listening to those around him and then either developing a plan based on what he was giving or use a plan purposed by a subordinate.

    I'm not sure if his men loved him or not, but I have very little doubt that Jackson's men respected him because of his abilities as a leader. Jackson's own reasons for hi success seem to be a mark that he was able to seize the opportunity for victory, which does fit the courage aspect of leadership laid out here. He also obviously was intelligent to put together a plan. An he also was strict when it came to discipline

    Again I'm drawn to the Battle of Fredericksburg and Burnside's failure there. He began the Fredericksburg campaign with a plan that relied on crossing the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg via a pontoon bridge. Ok, fine, there really was nothing wrong with the plan itself. We can of course argue that what was wrong with the plan was it's reliance on the pontoon bridge. But let's face it, if the pontoons had been with the first units as the reached Falmouth then Burnside could have begun crossing sooner than he did. However, the pontoons weren't there in time and Burnside stuck to his plan rather than proving he could adapt. His plan didn't fail to survive initial contact with the enemy, it had already failed before contact with the enemy because he failed to adapt and change it when a key component wasn't initially there. The plan to get across the river before Lee had enough forces in place to offer significant opposition could still have been used if Burnside had just changed his plans to cross further up stream. He did change to a new plan which did fail to survive initial contact with the enemy and sill Burnside didn't really change plans because it almost seems like he was thinking if he jut threw enough troops at Lee h could over power his entrenched position.

    On the subject of courage being the opportunity to seize certain victory I have to bring up McClellan at Antietam (Sharpsburg) and Lee at Gettysburg. McClellan was supposed to have had Lee's plans for the Maryland campaign which helped him stop Lee's Maryland campaign at Sharpsburg along Antietam Creek. But it is believed that McClellan could have used hose orders to secure a total victory over Lee, not just a strategic victory. In typical McClellan fashion he saw more to the orders than was really there, namely that they had been left as a trap, and moved too slowly to make full use o what he had. With Lee at Gettysburg it's the question of what his plans had been originally. Had the plan indeed been to draw the Army of the Potomac north away from Washington and then swing back south as to get between it and DC, choosing the ground and threatening the capital at the same time, then Lee himself missed an opportunity to potentially claim victory in the war by remaining to fight at Gettysburg. Lee really didn't have a choice of whether to fight at Gettysburg or not. But the idea of luring the AoP north and then swinging around means that he did have the choice to retreat from Gettysburg and pursue this plan. This plan is largely put forth by Longstreet and was denied by Lee in 1868 as having "never made any such promise, and had never thought of doing such a thing." Yet Lee's own post battle report he does state he had no intention of engaging the AoP so far away from home unless the AoP attacked first. So doe that mean that Lee did indeed plan to swing south and threaten DC? If so, then Lee did fail to obtain what might have been certain victory in favor of an unsure victory at Gettysburg.

  5. Discipline is organization, chain of command, and logistics. Organization means troops are grouped in a regulated manner. Chain of command means officers and NCOs to lead the troops. And logistics means overseeing supplies.

    Looking it up on Wikipedia the fifth condition is listed as management rather than Cleary's discipline. I think I prefer that term to discipline in terms of how Cleary explains discipline.

    Now as for the organization element I think I kinda have to go with McClellan. We all know that after First Bull Run (Manassas) he was put in charge of this rag tag army and whipped it into fighting shape. Effectively McClellan organized the troops into a significant fighting force which would prove the major Federal Army in the Eastern Theater for the duration of the war.

Last edited on Thu May 15th, 2014 03:08 am by Hellcat



 Posted: Thu May 15th, 2014 05:32 pm
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Isn't it peculiar a treatise two millennia old still rides the storm? Thought provoking post, Hellcat; regards as always.



 Posted: Fri May 16th, 2014 12:25 am
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Johan Steele
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A friend of mine at University noted that Sun Tzu was required reading at his Soviet Military Academy. It does indeed pass the test of time. As a note, one of the Emperors of Byzantium was gifted a translation of it...



 Posted: Fri May 16th, 2014 02:08 am
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Hellcat
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I could swear I was taught that some of the generals such as Lee and McClellan had read the book even though it wouldn't officially be translated into English until well after the war. Of course the person who taught me that might have mistaken Antoine-Henri Jomini's 1838 Précis de l'Art de la Guerre: Des Principales Combinaisons de la Stratégie, de la Grande Tactique et de la Politique Militaire which was translated in 1854 into English by Major O.F. Winship and Lieut. E.E. McLean as The Art of War (and again in 1862 by Capt. G.H. Mendell and Lieut. W.P. Craighill underthe same name) with Sun Tzu treatise. Jomini's book was a part of the curriculum at West Point according to The 1865 Customs of Service for Non-commissioned Officers and Soldiers by August V. Kautz and was probably a part of the curriculum prior to the war. But it would not have been read by men like Lee and McClellan in English when they were cadets but could have been read by them in such after they graduate. However, at he same time French was also part of the curriculum according to the Kautz's handbook and was likely a part of the curriculum when they were cadets. Indeed McClellan was interested in Jomini's theoretic strategic principles while he was a cadet.

However, of further interest is that Sun Tzu's book was first translate into French in 1772, almost a hundred years before the war, by Jean Joseph Marie Amiot. So as it was already in French, they might have read it anyway. Maybe Jomini even read it.



 Posted: Fri May 16th, 2014 06:30 am
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Hellcat
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Ok, I got to thinking about that first talking point, The Way, and I remembered the Haunting's thread I started back in 2010, in particular the 12th post and the claim of Washington's ghost supposedly "leading" the 20th Maine down the right path to Gettysburg. Now the story makes the claim that the men initially were excited because they believed the figure was McClellan resuming command of the Army of the Potomac. Just how true this is is naturally questionable as it is a ghost story. But for this thread I'm not bringing it up as a ghost story but more akin to Lee at Appomattox Court House. The men of the 20th Maine, and apparently other regiments, were excited by the thought of having McClellan back in command. And the story does touch on something, how at least many of the men of the Army of the Potomac felt about McClellan. He was affectionately their "Little Mac." So if the Way is ultimately about having the people feel close to their leaders, then wouldn't any general whose men felt enough affection for them that they give them such nicknames or take the blame onto themselves for a surrender fit this condition?



 Posted: Sun May 18th, 2014 06:56 am
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Hellcat
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Ok, this part from chapter 2, which Cleary calls Doing Battle caught my attention.

When you do battle, even if you are winning, if you continue for a long time it will dull your forces and bunt your edge; if you besiege a citadel, your strength will be exhausted. If you keep your armies out in the field for a long time, your supplies will be insufficient.

It was that last sentence that really caught my attention. It reminded me of RebelRouser's recent What made Grant great thread which got me to also thinking about various other threads where we've discussed Grant and Lee. And one of the things mentioned is that Grant was willing to fight a war of attrition. Grant was basically wearing down Lee's supply of troops, his ammunition supplies, and especially his food supplies by keeping both armies in the field.

For Grant it's almost the exact opposite of what Sun Tzu was warning against, but for Lee, it's almost exactly what he was warning against. By the end of the Appomattox Campaign I don't think that Grant's troops were any fresher than Lee's, but he did have the ability to replenish his troops and supplies where as Lee really couldn't afford to loose his. And as I recall, his army starving was on of the reasons Lee was willing to surrender to Grant.

There's a quote by a Confederate soldier I really like referring to Federal soldiers and loosing the war. "We coulda licked 'em with corn stalk, but dang they wouldn't fight with 'em." It does seem to hint at the North being able to offer its troops more supplies than the South was.



 Posted: Wed Jun 24th, 2015 10:12 am
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Been thinking about this thread again and looking over it caused me to look at the Battle of Fredericksburg, or more accurately prior to the battle. I'm referring to the second point in this situation and to Burnside.

We all know how much Burnside depended on the pontoons to cross the Rappahannock, but there were places he could have had the army ford the river. It was almost a month from the time the first elements of the Army of the Potomac arrived at Falmouth (November 17th) to the time they started building the pontoon bridges and the battle took place. In that time General Sumner pushed for the army to ford the river while there was still few Confederates to stand in their way. But Burnside feared that autumn rains were making the fords increasingly unfordable. So this would suggest that Burnside was looking at the weather as further reason to rely on the pontoons. Yet there are reports that show some of the fords within the Fredericksburg area were still fordable by December 1st, so why didn't Burnside use them then?



 Posted: Fri Jun 26th, 2015 06:23 am
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Hellcat
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Ok, the last post was back to Chapter 1 and the second talking point from that chapter. This post is going back to Chapter 2. I've already given one talking point for the chapter, which I'll reiterate. I will also give a number of additional talking points from the chapter. Going to refer to talking points by chapter and point (ex. Ch2-TP1)
  1. When you do battle, even if you are winning, if you continue for a long time it will dull your forces and bunt your edge; if you besiege a citadel, your strength will be exhausted. If you keep your armies out in the field for a long time, your supplies will be insufficient.

    See my post dated May 18, 2014 for my opinions on this point.

  2. Those who use the military skillfully do not raise troops twice and do not provide food three times.

    According to Cleary this means you raise or draft your soldiers only once then immediately claim victory, you don't go back to raise/draft a second time. Once raised, you provide food for the army just once then let them live off the enemy.

    Ultimately I think both elements of this talking point are governmental, and ultimately executive. Though I can think of a few points on that second element that may go to generals in the field.

    On that first element, raising/drafting troops and then claiming victory, I we're ultimately looking not at the generals but at Lincoln and Davis. That's not to say that some of the generals and other field commanders can't be looked at on this element. But on the whole I think these individuals were smaller efforts, more at the regimental level or even lower, which were just a larger part of the Federal and Confederate war effort. Maybe they were meant to be part of the larger army or maybe they were meant to be partisans that may or may not have fought with the main army of their side. But I'm thinking this refers more to that main army than smaller elements of it or even partisans. And in that, as I have already stated I think this is about Lincoln and Davis.

    So which President succeeded at this? Neither. The element is that you raise/draft once then immediately claim victory, you don't go back to raise draft a second time. This has me going back to what I remember being taught from first grade through high school graduation, that everyone on both sides thought it was going to be a short war, just one big battle and done. There's a quote from Lee from the spring of 1861 that I like on that matter. "They do not know what they say. If it comes to a conflict of arms, the war will last at least four years. Northern politicians do not appreciate the determination and pluck of the South, and Southern politicians do not appreciate the numbers, resources, and patient perseverance of the North. Both sides forget that we are all Americans. I forsee that the country will have to pass through a terrible ordeal, a necessary expiation, perhaps, for our national sins." We know now that Lee was right, this wasn't one quick battle and done. It was a long, bloody conflict that ran from 1861 to 1865.

    But for me to pick Lincoln or Davis as the one to have succeeded on this element then either the war would have had to have ended at First Bull Run (First Manassas) or they would have only had to call for volunteers in the spring of 1861, made do with that, and then claim victory. But the fact is that neither side could fight the war with just those volunteers. Beginning April 16, 1862 (Davis actually proposed this act nineteen days before the Confederate Congress passes it) both sides would pass draft acts, the most notorious of these led to the New York Draft Riots in the summer of 1863. So neither president could claim victory without at least a second draft.

    On the second element, providing food just once for the army and then letting them feed off the enemy, again this seems more governmental. But I'm also reminded of Lee and, especially, Sherman on this element. With Lee wasn't one of the reasons for both his Maryland Campaign and his Gettysburg Campaign to supply the army and thus alleviate the South, at least temporarily and in part, the trouble of having to feed his army? I don't know if he just had a set ration issued to the men before the start of the campaign and then depended on what the army could scavenge from the countryside once they passed into Maryland and Pennsylvania. I think this may have been more likely to happen in Pennsylvania than in Maryland, especially in 1862, as there was hope of Maryland rising up and seceding. With Sherman, well we all know the story of the March to the Sea. How Sherman intended to rely on what could be scavenged from the countryside to feed his army.

    Both Lee and Sherman are cases of not being the war as a whole, but both also look at the idea of feeding the army just once and then feeding off the enemy. But only in these instances. As a whole they certainly offered a more "regular" governmental feeding to their men than the idea of not feeding three times as Sun Tzu lays out. Regular being an operative term.

  3. By taking equipment from your own country but feeding off the enemy you can be sufficient in both arms and provisions.

    When a country is impoverished by military operations, it is because of transporting supplies to a distant place. Transport supplies to a distant place and the population will be impoverished.

    Those who are near the army sell at high prices. Because of high prices, the wealth of the population is exhausted.


    Ok, Cleary claims this means a) that the people are worn out by the expense of having to transport supplies over long distances, and b) that markets near the army see their prices go up. Both become a plague on nation during a long military campaign. According to Wikipedia this chapter is about the economy of warfare and the need to win decisive victories as quickly as possible. Certainly this talking point seems to go to the economic side.

    On that point I think I'd have to look at Old Fuss and Feathers himself. It was General Scott's Anaconda Plan that strangled the South. But this was just one factor. You also had both the Federal and the Confederate armies in the field, neither of which helped the South all that much. And there was the economic war the North waged against the South.

    In his book Civil War Schemes and Plots Webb Garrison discusses paper bullets, i.e. counterfeit Southern bank notes. These helped to destabilize the Southern economy, lowering the value of the dollar. You want only so much currency in circulation, especially against what you're backing it by. If you're backing it by, say, gold and gold is worth $100 a pound, then it's probably best not to have $100,000 in circulation when you've only got two hundred pounds of gold. That's fifty time as much currency as the value of that amount of gold, unless there's something else to back it against of equal or greater value to gold, or unless there is something of lesser value but in quantities equal to the value of a pound of gold, then how much is that currency really worth?Keep in mind I'm not economically savvy.

    As the blockade of the South became more effective, and with Federal troops in the field the value southern goods increased as those goods became harder and harder to obtain. Bleached cotton fabric in 1861 wound cost 12.5¢ a yard in 1861, by 1863 it was running $3.50 a yard. If I'm right on the math that's an increase of twenty-eight times the value in 1861. A cord of firewood ran $2.50 in 1861, $20 in 1862, $40 in 1863, $100 in 1864, and between $100 and $150 in 1865. So by 1862 a cord of firewood was eight times it's 1861 value but upwards of sixty time that value in 1865. Bacon per pound was 12.5¢ in 1861, 75¢ in 1862, $1.25 to $6 in 1863, $8 to $9 in 1864, and $11 to $13 in 1865. Or that's a 104 increase between 1861 and 1865. And finally flour, in 1861 a barrel would cost $6, $16 to $40 in 1862, $30 to $75 in 1863, $125 to $500 in 1864, and a whopping $325 to $1,000 in 1865. Or that's about 167 times the value of a barrel of flour between 1861 and 1865.

    And the blockade worked two ways, not only did it make it difficult for the South to get supplies in, it slowly made it difficult to ship things out as well.

    Looking at it I think Scott was as much looking to win the as much through economics as through starving the South.

  4. When resources are exhausted, then levies are made under pressure. When power and resources are exhausted, then the homeland is drained. The common people are deprived of seventy percent of their budget, wile the government's expenses for equipment amount to sixty percent of it's budget.

    Ok, so Cleary says that this means that people are the basis for a nation and food is what the people need to survive. Those in power need to consider the people under them, or perhaps behind them.

    For this point I'm again drawn to Lee and Sherman for the reasons I laid out in the second element of Ch2-TP2, but for opposite reasons. Again, Lee was looking to alleviate the burden on the people when he invaded the North. And to place the burden on the citizens of the North. Sherman really wasn't looking to alleviate the burden on the people of the North, they didn't suffer in the same way as those in the South did. But he was looking to bring the war to the people when he marched to Savannah.
  5. Therefore a wise general strives to feed off the enemy. Each pound of food taken from the enemy is equivalent to twenty pounds you provide by yourself.

    Cleary says that it takes twenty pounds of provisions to deliver just one pound to a distant army. On this point I'm yet again reminded of Lee's two Northern campaigns and Sherman's March to the Sea.

  6. Change their colors, use them mixed in with your own. Treat the soldiers well, take care of them.

    This is called over coming the opponent and increasing your strength to boot.


    Ok, I'm more combining two talking points into one, though their basically the same point. According to Cleary this means that you treat captured soldiers well so that they work for you. If you turn an enemy soldier against their comrades, then that makes you strong.

    To be honest I can't think of any general, or commander, this applies to. I keep thinking Camp Douglas, Elmira, Libby Prison, Andersonville, etc. on this and not really seeing much of either side getting POWs to turn against their own. I include it incase someone else can.

So those are the talking points I've laid out for Chapter 2 and my opinions pertaining to who fits them. I'd like to see some folks discuss the points I've laid out for the first two chapters a bit more.



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