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Joe Johnston and John Bell Hood - John Bell Hood - The Participants of the War - Mikitary & Civilian - Civil War Interactive Discussion Board
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 Posted: Mon Jun 18th, 2007 03:39 pm
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Badger
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Joe Johnston,facing overwhelming odds in the West,chose a "by-the-book"  strategy. General Lee,faced with overwhelming odds in the East,took great chances which he saw as necessity. I think Stonewall Jackson's proposal of smaller,more mobile rebel armies making quick strikes could have been very successful. The Western rebel armies,though equallly good fighters as their Eastern brothers,were doomed to inconsistent leadership at the top level. badger



 Posted: Tue Jun 19th, 2007 01:23 am
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JoanieReb
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Thank you Badger.

I am happy to have this input. 

Joanie

 

 



 Posted: Tue Nov 6th, 2007 02:15 am
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slowtrot
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susansweet said:

"Just think what if . . . Johnston had had the ability to see the troop movement from above the ground.  He would have seen McPherson's movement. "

He did see it.  First he sent Hood to check it out.  Then Hood reported that there was no one there.  Then after Mac was coming out the Gap's western exit, he was met by Rebel cavalry sent by Johnston to stop him.

 

Don

 



 Posted: Fri Feb 22nd, 2008 12:18 am
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samhood
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Johnnie Reb: You wrote: As I recall, General William Hardee was also a possibility for the position, and unlike Hood, had RE Lee's endorsement.

Did Lee endorse Hardee?  I think he made one brief comment "Hardee has more experience in managing an army."  That's all that I have ever read.  Did Lee elaborate or write something else?  And did Davis and Richmond need a manager for the Army of Tennessee in July 1864 with Sherman having driven 100 miles into Georgia in 3 months and only 15 miles from Atlanta? 



 Posted: Fri Feb 22nd, 2008 10:40 am
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ashbel
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Joe Johnston was a hard man to like.  He had this nasty habit of writing very long and very critical letters to his superiors - especially Jefferson Davis.  These letters started when he was not made the highest ranking officer in the Confederacy on day one and never stopped.

He also had another maddening character trait.  Everything had to be perfect for him to engage his troops.  War is not perfect.  So he was the master of excuses and defensive manuevers.  The defense of Atlanta was not the only place where this trait was exhibited.  He also sat with an army in Jackson, Mississippi and never came to the aid of Pemberton in Vicksburg.

Terry Winschel had the best story to explain Johnston's character.  It actually involved an incident after the War.  Johnston was an excellent shot - maybe the best marksman in the Confederate officer ranks.  One time E. Porter Alexander, Grover Cleveland and Johnston went on a duck hunting trip.  At the end of the day Alexander and Cleveland each had a boat load of birds (before the days of limits). And Johnston?  He didn't have a one.  Never had the perfect shot.



 Posted: Fri Feb 22nd, 2008 12:14 pm
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I'm a big fan of Sword's work. It is well mentioned here. But what has always influenced me is how the men who served under generals thought of them. Johnston was adored while Hood & Bragg were despised... at the very least. Another telling factor is what an enemy thinks of a man. Both Generals and private soldiers on the other side of the line respected the man.

Davis's fanatical loyalty to his friends and blind hatred of any he considered an enemy is quite telling in his relationship w/ Bragg/Hood/Johnston. I started out as a big fan of JEJ; but after years of study I see a general and a man fighting for a cause he wasn't completely on board w/ and a man who was totaly disapointed w/ his new govt. He genuinely cared for his troops and did what he could to minimze their pain and frankly he did a good job at that. Hood's first two attacks outside Atlanta were JEJ's plan, not Hoods.

In the end I have come to see JEJ as a flawed general and a flawed man. I think he did his best under trying, at best, circumstances.



 Posted: Fri Feb 22nd, 2008 12:21 pm
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As a note JEJ @ Vicksburg... Pemberton was well and truly boxed in. Any breakout attempt would have been brutally costly and it's chances of success were no better than Grants attempts to get in. JEJ faced a similar problem, if he tried to break into Vicksburg he might just have been forced into the works w/ Pembertons Army and faced the same fate merely prolonging the siege in the process.

So he opted for a third tactic; gather enough men to seriously threaten Grant's army, forcing it to break off the siege & consolidate thus lifting the siege. How succesful he might have been is a big what if; one that likely wouldn't have mattered as Grant's Army was ready to go over the top and storm Vicksburg if Pemberton hadn't surrendered. In some places the trenches were only 5 yards apart w/ men throwing trash & other... unsundry things into each others trenches. In shortGrant almost certainly could have taken Vicksburg had Pemberton not given up the city.



 Posted: Fri Feb 22nd, 2008 01:37 pm
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Somebody set me straight if I am wrong, but I am seeing remarkable similarities here between JEJ and McClellan:

a) both are extremely well-liked by their troops

b) both are notoriously cautious in the field

c) both are thorns in the sides of their respective administrations

The biggest difference between the two, as far as I know, is that McClellan was incredibly arrogant and self-delusional and JEJ was not, although both were capable of making excuses for themselves.

In the one campaign where they faced each other — the Peninsula — it was almost comical. JEJ is constantly giving ground, and McClellan is reluctant to take it. A very strange waltz, indeed.

My knowledge of the western theater is woefully thin, but if the bottom line in war is results, then I don't see where JEJ is any better than the other CSA generals in the west. Having said that, I always thought Beauregard was under-utilized and under-appreciated.



 Posted: Fri Feb 22nd, 2008 02:22 pm
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samhood
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Johan Steele wrote: I'm a big fan of Sword's work. It is well mentioned here. But what has always influenced me is how the men who served under generals thought of them. Johnston was adored while Hood & Bragg were despised... at the very least. Another telling factor is what an enemy thinks of a man. Both Generals and private soldiers on the other side of the line respected the man.



I am no fan of Sword.  He has an agenda and only shares historical evidence with his readers that he wants them to know.

Regarding Hood, here are a few quotes that DO NOT APPEAR in Sword's book.  Sword didn't hesitate to include words of criticism and hatred of Hood by some soldiers, but if Sword is writing a non-fiction book, why aren't these quotes included in his book?

Sam Watkins in Company Aytch:

He (Hood) was a noble, brave and good man, and we loved him for his virtues and goodness of heart.

We all loved Hood, he was such a clever fellow, and a good man.

Poor fellow, I loved him, not as a general, but as a good man.

Every impulse of his nature was to do good, and to serve his country as best he could.

General John B. Hood did all that he could. The die had been cast. Our cause had been lost before he took command. He fought with the everlasting grip of the bulldog and the fierceness of the wounded tiger. The army had been decimated until it was a mere skeleton...when he commenced his march into Tennessee.

Watkins’ epitaph for Hood in The Southern Bivouac 2 (May 1884):

But the half of brave Hood’s body molders here:
The rest was lost in honor’s bold career.
Both limbs and fame he scattered all around,
Yet still, though mangled, was with honor crowned;
For ever ready with his blood to part,
War left him nothing whole—except his heart.


Dr. Samuel Thompson, in Reminiscences of the 41st Tennessee, "Many, we know, will disagree with us, but we think to calmly and impartially view General Hood’s course we will be forced to accord to him abilities of the highest order and a military commander with but few superiors….What became of General Hood for the remainder of the war we do not know, but if he was removed for failure in Tennessee, he was treated very unjustly. That he did so, we believe was no fault of his. He failed simply because he had not men and supplies to contend with the immense force that was against him."

Henry A. Morehead, 11th Mississippi, Reminiscences of the Boys in Gray, 1861 –1865, compiled by Miss Mamie Yeary, 1912, page 539, “Gen. Hood was a brave man, and while he never won the affections of his men as some other commanders did, we may say ‘Peace to his ashes,’ for he was a good soldier and a true Southern man.”

Col. Virgil Murphey of the 17th Alabama, who had been captured at Franklin and was being held in Nashville, wrote that when prisoners learned of Hood's army advancing on Nashville, "About 300 Yankee bounty jumpers and prisoners in the yard yelled with delight and declared their readiness to rejoin Hood."

I don't doubt that more soldiers of the AoT disliked Hood than liked him, but if you're writing a fair and accurate book, why would you conceal this evidence.

Also, I'm not so sure that the the AoT hated Hood when he replaced Johnston, or whether it was more the fact that Johnston was relieved.  Sumner Cunningham wrote in Confederate Veteran in April, 1893, "The removal of General Johnston, and the appointment of Hood to succeed him in command of the Army of Tennessee, was an astounding event. So devoted to Johnston were his men that the presence and immediate command of General Robert E. Lee would not have been accepted without complaint."

Again...why do NONE of these quotes appear in Sword's book?



 Posted: Fri Feb 22nd, 2008 02:40 pm
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samhood
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Johan Steele wrote: He genuinely cared for his troops and did what he could to minimze their pain and frankly he did a good job at that. 
Something has always bothered me about Johnston.  I don't doubt that he cared about the troops and always avoided battles that he thought might result in high casualties, but I can't understand how he has evaded all criticism for his attack on Sherman at Bentonville, considering what he wrote after the war.

Johnston wrote in his postwar memoir that he accepted command of the AoT after Hood's resignation,"...with a full consciousness on my part, however, that we could have no other object, in continuing the war, other than to obtain fair terms of peace; for the Southern cause must have appeared hopeless then, to all intelligent and dispassionate Southern men. I therefore resumed the duties of my military grade with no hope beyond that of contributing to obtain peace on such conditions as, under the circumstances, ought to satisfy the Southern people and their Government." Johnston, who criticized Hood for the "useless butchery" at Franklin, nevertheless ordered the Army of Tennessee to attack Sherman's Union army at Bentonville and the ensuing defeat resulted in 3,092 Confederate casualties, including 800 killed.

If Johnston knew in February that the cause was lost and in his own words "hopeless" why did he initiate an attack in March that killed 800 soldiers of the Army of Tennessee?  If Hood's attack at Franklin was considered a waste of life when he was trying to destroy Schofield before he could escape to Nashville, what should the loss of life at Bentonville be called considering the commander himself admitted there was nothing to accomplish?

Last edited on Fri Feb 22nd, 2008 02:52 pm by samhood



 Posted: Fri Feb 22nd, 2008 02:49 pm
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Another couple quotes that Mr Sword omitted from his book.

Schofield explained the reasoning behind Hood's attack at Franklin, "Hood's assault at Franklin has been severely criticized. Even so able a general as J.E.Johnston has characterized it as ‘useless butchery'. These criticisms are based on a misapprehension of the facts, and are essentially erroneous. Hood must have been aware of our relative weakness of numbers at Franklin, and of the probable, if not certain, concentration of large reinforcements at Nashville. He could not hope to have at any future time anything like so great an advantage in that respect. The army at Franklin and the troops at Nashville were within one night's march of each other; Hood must therefore attack on November 30 or lose the advantage of greatly superior numbers. It was impossible, after the pursuit from Spring Hill, in a short day to turn our position or make any other attack but a direct one in front. Besides our position with the river on our rear, gave him the chance of vastly greater results, if his assault were successful, than could be hoped for by any attack he could make after we had crossed the Harpeth. Still more, there was no unusual obstacle to a successful assault at Franklin. The defenses were of the slightest character, and it was not possible to make them formidable during the short time our troops were in position, after the previous exhausting operations of both day and night, which had rendered some rest on the 30th absolutely necessary.


"The Confederate cause had reached a condition closely verging on desperation, and Hood's commander-in-chief had called upon him to undertake operations which he thought appropriate to such an emergency. Franklin was the last opportunity he could expect to have to reap the results hoped for in his aggressive movement. He must strike there, as best he could, or give up his cause as lost."


And LA Simmons of the 84th Illinois Inf. wrote, "In speaking of this battle, very many are inclined to wonder at the terrible pertinacity of the rebel General Hood, in dashing column after column with such tremendous force and energy upon our center -- involving their decimation, almost their annihilation? Yet this we have considered a most brilliant design, and the brightest record of his generalship, that will be preserved in history. He was playing a stupendous game, for enormous stakes. Could he have succeeded in breaking the center, our whole army was at his mercy. In our rear was a deep and rapid river, swollen by recent rains -- only fordable by infantry at one or two places -- and to retreat across it an utter impossibility. To break the center was to defeat our army; and defeat inevitably involved a surrender. If this army surrendered to him, Nashville, with all its fortifications, all its vast accumulation of army stores, was at his mercy, and could be taken in a day. Hence, with heavy odds -- a vastly superior force -- in his hands, he made the impetuous attack upon our center, and lost in the momentous game. His army well understood that they were fighting for the possession of Nashville. Ours knew they were fighting to preserve that valuable city, and to avoid annihilation."



 Posted: Fri Feb 22nd, 2008 02:57 pm
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ole
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An amazing post, samhoood. thanks eversomuch.



 Posted: Fri Feb 22nd, 2008 05:42 pm
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PC:

JEJ wasn't a pompous ass that might be the big difference.

Comparing the charge at Franklin to Pickett's charge

19,000 vs 12,500 men

4 miles over open ground vs. one mile

No artillery barrage to speak of vs. one-two hour barrage to soften up the enemy.

Lasted five hours after CS reached US lines vs over in 20 minutes.

Everyone gets choked up about Pickett's Charge but the AoT's efforts seem amazing to me. More of that eastern bias I like to point out ;).

Last edited on Fri Feb 22nd, 2008 05:43 pm by David White



 Posted: Fri Feb 22nd, 2008 06:18 pm
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samhood
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David White wrote: PC:

JEJ wasn't a pompous ass that might be the big difference.

Comparing the charge at Franklin to Pickett's charge

19,000 vs 12,500 men

4 miles over open ground vs. one mile

No artillery barrage to speak of vs. one-two hour barrage to soften up the enemy.

Lasted five hours after CS reached US lines vs over in 20 minutes.

Everyone gets choked up about Pickett's Charge but the AoT's efforts seem amazing to me. More of that eastern bias I like to point out ;).


By most accounts Johnston was a pretty arrogant guy...maybe not pompous.  But then again, back in the nineteenth century, professional soldiers of high rank were quite image-conscience, and what we might consider today "uppity" acting.

The charge at Franklin was over a distance of slightly under 2 miles, not 4.  And yes, there was no artillery support by Hood since most of his artillery had yet to arrive from Columbia by 4:00 pm, when the attack was launched.  (Sunset was at 4:56 and Hood felt that he could not wait.)

The Army of Tennessee's effort at Franklin impressed Hood too.  This quote by him in his memoirs appears neither in Sword's book nor McDonough and Connelly's...

"The attack (at Franklin), which entailed so great a sacrifice of life, had become a necessity as imperative as that which impelled Gen. Lee to order the assault at Gaines’ Mill, when our troops charged across an open space, a distance of one mile, under a most galling fire of musketry and artillery, against an enemy heavily entrenched. The heroes in that action fought not more gallantly than the soldiers of the Army of Tennessee upon the fields of Franklin."

Hood compared the soldiers of the AoT at Franklin to his own namesake Hood's Texas Brigade at perhaps their most famous battle--Gaines' Mill.

  



 Posted: Fri Feb 22nd, 2008 06:52 pm
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samhood
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susansweet wrote: The more I read about Hood the more I don't like him.   The more I read about Johnston I notice he has something Hood doesn't have . . . He has a code of Honor. 

Susan


Hood is criticized for writing letters to Bragg and Davis "backstabbing" Johnston. I'm not so sure that such things were not uncommon during that era.  Hood wasn't the only AoT commander to write to Richmond during Johnston's tenure. 

On June 22, 1864, Johnston's trusted subordinate, close confidant and corps commander  William Hardee, wrote to Jefferson Davis, "If the present system continues we may find ourselves at Atlanta before a serious battle is fought."

Another of Johnston's corps commanders, A. P. Stewart, wrote to Braxton Bragg on March 19, 1864, "Are we to hold still, remaining on the defensive in this position until (Sherman) comes down with his combined armies to drive us out?"

I don't think Hardee and Stewart have ever been accused of trying to get Johnston fired so they could get his job.

Joe Wheeler wrote to Richmond as well, although I can't find the exact quote.

And after Hood was given command of the AoT, his subordinates wrote to Richmond complaining of him.  After the fall of Atlanta one of Hood's division commanders, Samuel G. French sent an unsigned letter to Richmond complaining of Hood.  After the Tennessee Campaign, on Dec. 25 Hood's corps commander SD Lee wrote a letter to Hood's superior PGT Beauregard asking to discuss "recent events in Tennessee."  And on Jan. 2 Nathan Bedford Forrest wrote a letter to Dick Taylor asking that Hood be removed from command.

I don't think Lee and Forrest were wanting Hood fired so they could get his job.

Hood indeed wrote to Davis and Bragg during Sherman's Atlanta Campaign, but he wasn't the only one, and Hood's own subordinates wrote to his superiors.

As with everything else, Wiley Sword chose not to inform his readers of this.

It would require some research, but I suspect that writing letters to the superior of your superior was not considered as taboo in the 1860s as it is today.

 



 Posted: Fri Feb 22nd, 2008 07:32 pm
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EricJacobson
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Hood certainly has his shortcoming, but I have to say Johnston is certainly not blameless.  I'll explain.  An army commander should have open dialogue with his superior, in this case Davis.  Johnston was an utter failure in this regard.  His obsessive secretive nature certainly drove Davis half mad.  Whether Davis asked Hood to write letters or Hood acted on his may never be known, but Johnston was his own worst enemy.  If he had communicated with Davis like Lee did, the letter writing likely would not have started or been tolerated.  Imagine Longstreet writing to Davis complaining about Lee.  Hood is not innocent, but why do you think a soldier like Hardee would write to Davis?  Because he had a problem with Hood?  No - because he saw problems with Johnston's strategy.

Johnston may had honor, but he was a terrible communicator.  Hood's letter writing did not change the fact that Johnston retreated until Sherman was 10 miles from Atlanta.  At that point, Davis gave Johnston one final chance to explain his strategy and Johnston failed again.  No answer, just ambiguous talk of waiting for Sherman's next move.

Blame Hood if you will for writing letters.  Johnston built his own gallows, but frankly Hood's letters may have only confirmed what Davis already knew.  Johnston was never going to fight for Atlanta.



 Posted: Fri Feb 22nd, 2008 07:35 pm
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Minor point, but the sun sets at 4:35 p.m. on November 30.  It is dark by 5:15 p.m.  Hood was running out of daylight and a decision, one way or the other, had to be made and quickly.



 Posted: Fri Feb 22nd, 2008 08:13 pm
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ashbel
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EJ

You hit the nail on the head - Johnston was an excellent tactician but an incompetent strategist.  He would have kept retreating to Key West in the defense of Atlanta. 

He just could never quite understand how his decisions fit into the bigger picture.  If I were Davis, I would have relieved him from command as well. 



 Posted: Fri Feb 22nd, 2008 08:16 pm
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JoanieReb
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Great to see this thread come to life again!

Well, one thing for Joe Johnston - at least he was consistent in certain matters:

"Terry Winschel had the best story to explain Johnston's character.  It actually involved an incident after the War.  Johnston was an excellent shot - maybe the best marksman in the Confederate officer ranks.  One time E. Porter Alexander, Grover Cleveland and Johnston went on a duck hunting trip.  At the end of the day Alexander and Cleveland each had a boat load of birds (before the days of limits). And Johnston?  He didn't have a one.  Never had the perfect shot."

Compare this with my post on the bottom of the first page, describing Joe's hunting trip with Wade Hampton, which I am think took place before the war (I'll check my source when I can).

Or, maybe he was a slow learner?  Or, maybe he had a secret soft spot for birds.....

Anyway, he was pro'bly no fun on hunting trips.  But this was obviously something typical of him, and people made note.  It is interesting that these two very similar hunting trips were remembered and recorded by persons trying to describe Joe's faults.  Be especailly interesting if it turns out that the Wade Hampton trip was indeed before the war, with the other one afterward.  Slow growth of character, indeed!

Last edited on Fri Feb 22nd, 2008 08:23 pm by JoanieReb



 Posted: Sat Feb 23rd, 2008 08:03 am
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samhood
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Ladies and Gents:

If anyone is interested in reading a detailed account of Jefferson Davis's displeasure (understatement!) with Joe Johnston, below is a longgggg link to a letter from Davis to Sen. James Phelan of Mississippi near the end of the war.  It is in the OR and is 8 pages long.  The letter was purportedly an outline of court martial charges that Davis was preparing against Johnston, but the end of the war kept it from being undertaken.  Davis gives a very convincing argument against Johnston, and if nothing else, it explains why Davis hated Johnston-the army commander-so much.

If the link doesn't work, go to the OR, Series 1, Vol. 47 (Part II) Pages 1304-1311

http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/moa/pageviewer?root=%2Fmoa%2Fwaro%2Fwaro0099%2F&tif=01306.TIF&cite=http%3A%2F%2Fcdl.library.cornell.edu%2Fcgi-bin%2Fmoa%2Fmoa-cgi%3Fnotisid%3DANU4519-0099&coll=moa&frames=1&view=50



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